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CURING THE FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY MUDDLE
THROUGH A BREYER-BASED BLEND UP? TOWARD A LESS
CATEGORICAL, MORE VALUES-ORIENTED APPROACH FOR
SELECTING STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Clay Calvert*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that the United States Supreme Court should
significantly alter its current categorical approach for discerning standards
of judicial review in free-speech cases. The present system should become
nondeterminative and be augmented with a modified version of Justice
Stephen Breyer’s long-preferred proportionality framework. Specifically,
the Article’s proposed tack fuses facets of today’s policy, which largely
pivots on distinguishing content-based laws from content-neutral laws and
letting that categorization determine scrutiny, with a more nuanced, valuesand-interests methodology. A values-and-interests formula would allow the
Court to climb up or down the traditional ladder of scrutiny rungs – strict,
intermediate or rational basis – depending on whether a statute jeopardizes
a core rationale for safeguarding free expression and the degree to which
that rationale is threatened. Given the frequent divide along partisan lines
on today’s Supreme Court over scrutiny in First Amendment speech cases,
a two-tiered approach that blends aspects of a categorical strategy with a
values-and-interests tack provides a path forward as the Court moves fully
into the third decade of the twenty-first century.
*
Professor of Law, Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the
Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida in Gainesville, Fla. The author
thanks student Katharine G. Haddad of the University of Florida’s Levin College of Law for her
assistance with this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Justice Elena Kagan, writing in 2018 on behalf of the United States
Supreme Court’s four liberal-leaning members in dissent in Janus v.
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, chided
the five-justice conservative majority for “weaponizing the First
Amendment.”1 Elaborating on this accusation, she criticized the majority
for “turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against
workaday economic and regulatory policy.”2 What partly piqued Kagan’s
ire in Janus was the majority’s decision to deploy a heightened level of
scrutiny, rather than a variation of the deferential rational basis standard of
review, to analyze and strike down a state statute affecting funding for
public-sector labor unions during collective bargaining for violating the
First Amendment.3 As Professor Erica Goldberg encapsulated it, Kagan
“accused . . . the majority of demeaning the majesty of the First Amendment
in order to use it to suit their own political preferences – in this case,
defunding public sector unions.”4
The day before ruling in Janus, the same five-to-four composition of
justices fractured over the use of heightened scrutiny by the majority in
1.
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). See id. at 2487 (noting that Kagan
was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor). The First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-five years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause as fundamental liberties applicable for governing the actions of state and local government
entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (finding “that freedom of
speech and of the press – which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress –
are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”).
2.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
3.
There are three traditional tiers of judicial review in U.S. constitutional law – strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review – with rational basis being the most deferential
test and the one that applies when “a law . . . only minimally burdens constitutional rights (the vast bulk
of all laws) . . . .” Christina E. Wells, Beyond Campaign Finance: The First Amendment Implications of
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government, 66 MO. L. REV. 141, 158 (2001). Writing for the majority in
Janus, Justice Samuel Alito Jr. concluded that the dissent’s call for using a version of “rational-basis
review” amounted to a “form of minimal scrutiny [that] is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence, and
we reject it here.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. See Clay Calvert, Is Everything a Full-Blown First
Amendment Case After Becerra and Janus? Sorting Out Standards of Scrutiny and Untangling “Speech
as Speech” Cases from Disputes Incidentally Affecting Expression, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 73, 125–28
(addressing the majority’s decision to use heightened scrutiny in Janus).
4.
Erica Goldberg, First Amendment Cynicism and Redemption, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 959, 969
(2020).
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National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra.5 The majority
opinion, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, held that a California statute
that compelled licensed crisis pregnancy centers—facilities commonly
operated by pro-life, anti-abortion religious groups—to notify women on
their premises that the state provides free and low-cost abortions was subject
to heightened review because it was a content based statute.6 The majority,
in turn, concluded that the organizations challenging the law were likely to
succeed on their First Amendment-based speech claim against California.7
Writing in dissent on behalf of the Court’s liberal wing in Becerra,
Justice Stephen Breyer attacked the majority’s conclusion that heightened
scrutiny was presumptively warranted simply because the statute was
content based.8 He contended that “[b]ecause much, perhaps most, human
behavior takes place through speech and because much, perhaps most, law
regulates that speech in terms of its content, the majority’s approach at the
least threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of
much, perhaps most, government regulation.”9 By “suggesting that
heightened scrutiny applies to much economic and social legislation”10
merely because laws regulating it are content based, the majority—as
Breyer averred—does “a serious disservice through dilution”11 to traditional
rationales for protecting speech, including facilitating truth seeking in the
marketplace of ideas and shielding from censorship unpopular ideas.12
In her Janus dissent, Justice Kagan also intimated that deploying
heightened scrutiny degrades another core First Amendment value—
namely, protecting democratic self-governance.13 Ultimately, the majority’s
approach to scrutiny in Becerra and Janus readily taps into what Professor
Tabatha Abu El-Haj calls the Roberts Court’s “increasing suspicions of
5.
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
6.
Id. at 2371. The majority ultimately concluded the law could not “survive even
intermediate scrutiny,” much less strict scrutiny. Id. at 2375.
7.
Id. at 2376.
8.
Id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9.
Id.
10.
Id. at 2382.
11.
Id. at 2383.
12.
Id. at 2382–83.
13.
See Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (concluding that “almost all economic and regulatory policy affects or touches speech. So
the majority’s road runs long. And at every stop are black-robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices. The
First Amendment was meant for better things. It was meant not to undermine but to protect democratic
governance . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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content-based speech regulation.”14
Indeed, the macro-level fear here is that applying heightened scrutiny
solely because a law is categorized as a content based regulation, rather than
using heightened scrutiny because a law threatens traditional First
Amendment values,15 facilitates the First Amendment’s deployment as a
wrecking ball against a wide range of economic and social legislation that
otherwise would face only rational basis review.16 This tack signals, as
Breyer suggested in Becerra, a return to the Lochner era, with the First
Amendment now being used for goring social, economic and welfare
legislation.17 In brief, selecting heightened scrutiny simply because a law
is categorized as content based greases the skids for “the process of
deregulation by First Amendment.”18
This Article addresses the growing friction over how standards of
judicial scrutiny should be selected in First Amendment cases. Part I
reviews the Court’s current categorical methodology for free-speech
jurisprudence generally and, more specifically, as it affects scrutiny by
categorizing laws as either content based or content neutral.19 Part II then
explores Justice Breyer’s alternative approach to scrutiny, which considers
categories such as content based and content neutral merely as rules of
thumb and that, instead, leans more heavily on whether core First
14.
Tabatha Abu El-Haj, “Live Free or Die”—Liberty and the First Amendment, 78 OHIO ST.
L.J. 917, 917 (2017).
15.
For example, truth seeking and democratic self-governance are traditional First
Amendment values that Breyer dubbed in Becerra as “the true value[s] of protecting freedom of
speech.” Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2383 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and Desirable), 14
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 403 (2016) (observing that rational basis is used “to analyze government
economic regulations and social welfare legislation when there is no discrimination based on a suspect
classification or infringement of a fundamental right”).
17.
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Historically, the Court has been wary
of claims that regulation of business activity, particularly health-related activity, violates the
Constitution. Ever since this Court departed from the approach it set forth in Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), ordinary economic and social legislation has been thought to raise little constitutional
concern.” (citations omitted)). In Lochner, the Court concluded that an individual’s liberty and freedom
of contract took priority over the government’s police power to enforce, in the interest of public health,
a labor law limiting the number of hours per week that bakers could work. During the so-called Lochner
era, the Court declared invalid many laws “for infringing freedom of contract.” Chemerinsky, supra note
16, at 408.
18.
Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 323, 331 (2016).
19.
Infra notes 22–55 and accompanying text.
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Amendment ideals are imperiled.20 Finally, Part III advocates for replacing
today’s categorical framework for scrutiny with a modified version of
Breyer’s approach that blends consideration of current categories with a
values-based balancing methodology.21
I. LIVING IN A CATEGORICAL WORLD:
LEVELS OF PIGEONHOLING IN FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE AND THEIR IMPACT ON SCRUTINY
First Amendment free-expression jurisprudence is systemically
categorical. It is a framework that, on first glance, appears to foster
predictability and consistency by warding off dangers of an ad hoc
balancing methodology that inefficiently weighs anew, with each case,
speech interests against the harms that such expression might cause.22
Today’s categorical approach to free-speech disputes is multi-tiered,
featuring at least four levels of categorization.23
At the threshold level, the issue is whether the underlying matter
spawning a lawsuit should be categorized as speech or conduct.24 Matters
falling into the latter grouping generally reside outside the scope of First
Amendment protection.25 “Generally” is purposefully deployed above
20.
Infra notes 56–77 and accompanying text.
21.
Infra notes 78–86 and accompanying text.
22.
See Wayne Batchis, On the Categorical Approach to Free Speech – And the Protracted
Failure to Delimit the True Threats Exception to the First Amendment, 37 PACE L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2016)
(noting that “[o]n its face, a categorical structure establishes a consistent rule-based methodology that
constrains courts, promoting – if not ensuring – disciplined predictability in free speech jurisprudence,”
and adding that “it allows for a default rule that – consistent with the unequivocal language of the First
Amendment itself – affords virtually absolute protection against content based suppression . . . .”); see
also Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV.
671, 673 (1983) (“An ad hoc approach weighs, in each particular case, the interests served by the speech
against the asserted state interest in prohibition or regulation.”).
23.
Cf. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 386 –87 (2009) (identifying three levels of categorical analysis in First
Amendment law).
24.
See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018) (noting
that “[w]hile drawing the line between speech and conduct can be difficult, this Court’s precedents have
long drawn it.”).
25.
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that “a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression . . .
is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all.”); see also R. Randall Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint
Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine, 52 IND. L. REV. 355, 356 (2019) (noting that “[g]overnmental
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because a second tier of categorization is whether conduct may be classified
as symbolic expression, thereby triggering possible First Amendment
protection.26 Examples of symbolic speech range from burning the flag of
the United States of America in political protest to dancing naked in a
sexually oriented business as a form of sexual expression.27 This caveat of
symbolic expression to the speech-conduct dichotomy ultimately is just one
of multiple exceptions to the categorical rules that animate First
Amendment law and that, in turn, muddle what at first seemingly are crisp,
clear-cut distinctions.28 In brief, these carveouts shatter the illusion of
clarity that a categorical framework for judicial analysis appears to hold.
The categorizing, however, does not stop with the first two levels. A
third stage arises once a court determines that either “pure speech” or
symbolic expression is in play.29 The issue here is whether the speech falls
into a category of expression that the Supreme Court has deemed generally
outside the wall of First Amendment coverage. As Justice Anthony
Kennedy wrote in 2002, “[t]he freedom of speech has its limits; it does not
embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement,
obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.”30 The Court
began identifying such categorical carveouts from First Amendment
regulations of conduct . . . are outside of the ambit of the First Amendment”); Amanda Shanor, First
Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318, 319 (2018) (“The animating premise of much First
Amendment theory and case law is that some things are speech, which fall within the First Amendment’s
ambit, and others are conduct, and so fall outside it.”).
26.
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The First Amendment affords
protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”); see also Diahann DaSilva,
Playing a “Labeling Game”: Classifying Expression as Conduct as a Means of Circumventing First
Amendment Analysis, 56 B.C. L. REV. 767, 773 (2015) (“Conduct receives First Amendment protection
when it is intended to convey a message and that message is likely to be understood.”).
27.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (concluding that Gregory Lee Johnson’s
burning of the flag of the United States of America outside of the 1984 Republican National Convention
“implicate[d] the First Amendment”); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 (1991) (observing, in the context of a
lawsuit involving two businesses that wanted to provide totally nude dancing to patrons as a form of
entertainment, that “nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so”).
28.
See infra notes 35–36 and 41 and accompanying text (addressing exceptions to other
categorical rules in First Amendment law).
29.
Cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (describing a federal statute that barred
the disclosure of information obtained from an illegally intercepted telephone call as “a regulation of
pure speech”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) (describing
the wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam War as being “closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which,
we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment”).
30.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002).
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protection nearly eighty years ago in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, opining
that “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem.”31 The Chaplinsky Court excluded categories
of speech from First Amendment shelter based upon their lack of value
when weighed against society’s interests in order and morality.32
Chaplinsky, in short, “modeled the categorical approach to setting the First
Amendment’s boundaries.”33
Here too there are caveats that cloud the “categorical exclusion
doctrine,”34 such as the fact that while it is illegal to distribute obscene
speech, one can freely possess it at home.35 Similarly, while fighting words
constitute a generally unprotected category of expression, the government
cannot go inside that free-speech exception and selectively restrict fighting
words regarding only some topics, but not others, “based on hostility—or
favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”36
If, however, the speech at issue is not pigeonholed into one of these
unprotected categories—if, in contrast, it is presumptively safeguarded by
31.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). See Burton Caine, The
Trouble With “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First Amendment Values
and Should be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 443 (2004) (observing that in Chaplinsky the Court
decided “to carve out, in wholesale fashion, vast categories of exceptions to the First Amendment’s
otherwise unqualified protection of speech”).
32.
Justice Frank Murphy wrote for the Court that categories of speech such as obscenity and
fighting words could be jettisoned from the First Amendment’s penthouse of protection because they
serve “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. This is known as the low-value theory of free expression. See
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 194
(1983) (noting that “[t]he ‘low’ value theory first appeared in the famous dictum of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire”).
33.
Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and Categorical First
Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1343 (2015).
34.
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech,
44 SETON HALL L. REV. 395, 407 (2014).
35.
Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“We hold that obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”), with Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
565 (1969) (“Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think
they reach into the privacy of one’s own home.”).
36.
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). In this instance, the Court held
unconstitutional a St. Paul, Minnesota, ordinance that applied “only to ‘fighting words’ that insult, or
provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ Displays containing abusive
invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the
specified disfavored topics.” Id. at 391.
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the First Amendment—then a fourth categorization phase comes into play
when lawmakers nonetheless attempt to regulate it. This fourth tier of
categorization is the one at the heart of this Article, and it directly affects
how rigorously or deferentially a court examines a statute restricting
protected speech. It pivots on classifying a statute as content neutral, content
based, or viewpoint based.37
Laws falling into the content neutral category are subject to the
heightened yet generally deferential intermediate scrutiny standard,38 while
content based measures must surmount the more rigorous and demanding
strict scrutiny test.39 Viewpoint-based laws—a subset of content based ones
that involve government discrimination against some viewpoints, but not
others, on a particular subject or topic—are considered especially
reprehensible to the First Amendment and are always unconstitutional.40
37.
See Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget
Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 131, 131 (2008) (“In its jurisprudence, the Court has
recognized three categories of regulations on expression: content neutral, content based, and viewpoint
based. Whether a regulation will be upheld depends in large measure on the Court’s initial determination
of the category to which it belongs.”).
38.
Id. at 131–32. Intermediate scrutiny requires the government to demonstrate that it has a
significant interest justifying a law and that the law’s terms are narrowly drawn. Packingham v. North
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017). Under intermediate scrutiny, however, a law “need not be the
least restrictive or least intrusive means of” serving the government’s interest in order for it to be
narrowly drawn. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). As the Court has noted,
“[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s
interest, however, the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the
government’s interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.” Id. at 800.
Additionally, when intermediate scrutiny is applied in the context of content-neutral time, place and
manner regulations, the test requires the regulation in question to “leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information” rather than completely banning the speech. Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). This is sometimes known as the “alternativechannels-of-communication prong” of intermediate scrutiny. Clay Calvert & Minch Minchin, Can the
Undue-Burden Standard Add Clarity and Rigor to Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment
Jurisprudence? A Proposal Cutting Across Constitutional Domains for Time, Place & Manner
Regulations, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 623, 630 (2017). In practice, intermediate scrutiny in free-speech cases
often amounts to “a highly deferential form of review which virtually all laws pass.” Leslie Kendrick,
Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 237 (2012).
39.
Strict scrutiny is “a demanding standard” that requires the government to prove that a law
“is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.” Brown
v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011). Narrowly drawn, in contrast to its meaning for the
intermediate scrutiny test noted immediately above, means that a law “must be the least restrictive means
of achieving a compelling state interest.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014). Strict scrutiny
“nearly always proves fatal” for the laws that are subjected to it. Kendrick, supra note 38, at 237.
40.
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (asserting that “what we have termed
‘viewpoint discrimination’ is forbidden”) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
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Exceptions from the categorical approach at this fourth level exist that once
again muddy the seeming clarity. For example, statutes regulating
advertising content—commercial speech, in First Amendment
nomenclature—are reviewed under a version of intermediate scrutiny rather
than, as one might expect for a content-based regulation, strict scrutiny.41
Nonetheless, there is a “nearly categorical application of strict scrutiny
in cases involving content-based speech restrictions.”42 The Supreme Court
added teeth to this inelastic categorical principle in the 2015 case of Reed v.
Town of Gilbert.43 Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas
observed that a law is content based if it “applies to particular speech
because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed”44 thereby
“draw[ing] distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.”45 Thomas
wrote that laws that are content based on their face are subject to “strict
scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral
justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated
speech.”46 In other words, a noble legislative purpose will not spare a law
from the arduous strict scrutiny test. Additionally, even facially neutral laws
are categorized as content based and must surmount strict scrutiny if they
were adopted because lawmakers disagreed with the underlying message
conveyed.47 In short, a law that by its terms seemingly applies equally—i.e.,
515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995)); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (“When the government targets not subject
matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all
the more blatant. . . . Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.”);
see also Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly
Malleable Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 69, 76–77 (1997) (“Viewpoint regulations go beyond
regulating speech on a particular topic or subject matter. They regulate one side of a debate or topic but
not the other. In brief, one viewpoint on a particular issue is treated more favorably under a law . . . than
another on the same issue.”).
41.
See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (noting that “we engage in
‘intermediate’ scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech,” and explaining that the Court has “always
been careful to distinguish commercial speech from speech at the First Amendment’s core”); see also
Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Pandora’s Box of 21st Century Commercial Speech Doctrine: Sorrell, R.A.V.,
and Purpose-Constrained Scrutiny, 19 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 19, 31 (2014) (noting that the
Supreme “Court has chosen to apply intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech regulation rather than
a stricter or more lenient standard of review”).
42.
David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 398
(2015).
43.
576 U.S. 155 (2015).
44.
Id. at 163.
45.
Id.
46.
Id. at 165.
47.
Id. at 164.
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neutrally – to all topics and subjects, but which was, in fact, adopted for a
content based “purpose and justification,” faces strict scrutiny review.48
The ramifications of this categorical approach to scrutiny are enormous.
As Professors Dan Kozlowski and Derigan Silver note, “it is much easier
for a law to pass intermediate scrutiny than strict scrutiny, making the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws important.”49
First Amendment scholar David Hudson agrees, writing that “[t]he
distinction is often outcome determinative in free-speech cases, as most
content-based laws are struck down and most content-neutral laws are
upheld.”50 To paraphrase Justice Kagan’s concerns from Janus, strict
scrutiny is a powerful First Amendment weapon in the judiciary’s arsenal
for attacking and destroying the handiwork of lawmakers.51
Applying strict scrutiny to content-based laws is a blunt, short-cut
methodology for resolving First Amendment battles. That is because, as
Professor Han remarks, it eliminates the need for judges and justices “to
meaningfully articulate and wrestle with their foundational intuitions
regarding the value of the right at stake and the relevant regulatory interests
in order to reach the preordained outcome.”52 That preordained outcome is
a law being struck down, as “strict scrutiny leaves few survivors.”53
48.
Id. at 166.
49.
Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content Discrimination
in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 191, 196
(2019).
50.
David L. Hudson, Jr., The Content-Discrimination Principle and the Impact of Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 259, 261 (2019).
51.
Janus v. Am. Federation of State, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting);
supra note 1 accompanying text.
52.
Han, supra note 42, at 399.
53.
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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More problematically, the logic that strict scrutiny must be used because
a law is content-based means that strict scrutiny applies even when the
content being regulated is of exceedingly low value and a more deferential
standard of review might be more appropriate. As Professor Han explains,
although certain categories of speech have been excluded from all First
Amendment coverage because of their low value,54
there remains a strong intuition that not all remaining
speech ought to be valued equally, and that applying the
strict scrutiny default rule is too severe in particular cases.
In other words, in some subset of cases, the default rule of
strict scrutiny does not fit, in that its application does not
match our fundamental intuitions regarding the value of
speech and the social harms associated with the speech.55
In brief, applying strict scrutiny when core First Amendment values are
not threatened by a statute that regulates low-value speech is judicial
overkill. However, Justice Breyer’s approach for determining scrutiny
directly injects a healthy dose of First Amendment values into the equation
to counteract this malady.
54.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Stone, supra note 32 and
accompanying text (addressing Chaplinsky’s low-value theory of expression to eliminate certain
varieties of speech from any First Amendment protection).
55.
Han, supra note 42, at 400–01.
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II. THE BREYER APPROACH:
DEVOLVING RIGID CATEGORIES INTO RULES OF THUMB,
LETTING FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES TAKE CENTER STAGE
When it comes to scrutiny in First Amendment cases, Justice Stephen
Breyer is the Court’s categorical contrarian. He even questions the merits
of the threshold inquiry addressed earlier of categorizing the underlying
artifact in a case as speech or conduct.56 Breyer explained in 2017 that
“because virtually all government regulation affects speech,” it often is
better for the Court “not to try to distinguish between ‘speech’ and
‘conduct’” when the government regulates activities in which humans relate
via speech.57 The implication here is that just because speech may be
affected by a law does not turn a case challenging it into an all-out First
Amendment battle over freedom of speech, writ large, necessitating
heightened scrutiny standards. Justice Kagan seemingly endorsed Breyer’s
desire to collapse the speech-versus-conduct dichotomy in Janus, observing
that “[s]peech is everywhere – part of every human activity (employment,
health care, securities trading, you name it). For that reason, almost all
economic and regulatory policy affects or touches speech.”58 To the extent
that initially categorizing a law as affecting speech, rather than as regulating
conduct, triggers the need to apply a heightened tier of First Amendment
review (either intermediate or strict scrutiny), rather than a lower level of
analysis (rational basis),59 then the first-level phase of categorization should
be jettisoned.60 Speech and conduct are simply too inextricably intertwined
56.
See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018); Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); supra notes 24–
25 accompanying text (describing this first-level phase of categorization).
57.
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
concurring). Justice Breyer reinforced his stance regarding the intertwined—rather than separable and
dichotomized—nature of speech and conduct the next year in Becerra, observing there that “much,
perhaps most, human behavior takes place through speech.” Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
58.
Janus v. Am. Fed. State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
59.
See Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do PostMcDonald?, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 495 (2012) (“The lowest level of review is the rational
basis test—a highly deferential form of scrutiny. In order for a regulation to survive rational basis review,
the challenger must prove that the regulation does not bear a ‘rational relationship’ to a ‘legitimate
governmental purpose.’”).
60.
See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that
“it is often wiser not to try to distinguish between ‘speech’ and ‘conduct’”).
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in many laws, particularly those affecting economic and social welfare, that
time is better spent on tasks other than untangling them.
Beyond this first-level categorical concern, Breyer contended in 2019
that the “Court’s speech-related categories,” such as “content
discrimination” and “viewpoint discrimination,” should serve only “as rules
of thumb,” rather than as “outcome-determinative rules,” when resolving
First Amendment cases.61 He elaborated that “[r]ather than deducing the
answers to First Amendment questions strictly from categories, as the Court
often does, I would appeal more often and more directly to the values the
First Amendment seeks to protect.”62 He sounded the same sentiment in
Reed v. Town of Gilbert,63 contending that:
[t]he First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity
both to the Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the
public’s legitimate need for regulation than a simple
recitation of categories, such as “content discrimination”
and “strict scrutiny,” would permit. In my view, the
category “content discrimination” is better considered in
many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather
than as an automatic “strict scrutiny” trigger, leading to
almost certain legal condemnation.64
As these quotations reveal, Breyer’s approach to scrutiny is not dictated
by categories. Categories simply are rules of thumb—they are “helpful, but
not determinative legal tool[s]” that serve “as a supplement” to another
analysis.65 That other analysis hinges on the extent to which a law threatens
First Amendment values and objectives. Focusing on First Amendment
values is essential for Breyer because they are, in his view, “the
constitutional analogue of statutory purposes.”66
In particular, Breyer’s approach to scrutiny asks whether a law “work[s]
harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate to their
61.

Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2304 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring part, dissenting in

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 2305 (emphasis added).
576 U.S. 155 (2015); see supra notes 43–48 accompanying text (addressing Reed).
Reed, 576 U.S. at 175–76 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. at 179.
STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 162 (2010).

part).
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furtherance of legitimate regulatory objectives.”67 This “proportionality
question” is the heart of his methodology for determining if a law passes
First Amendment muster. 68 In brief, the “seriousness of the harm to speech”
must be weighed against “the importance of the countervailing objectives”
in regulating it.69 This, Breyer acknowledges, is a balancing tack.70
What is key here is that laws receive closer, more exacting scrutiny
when they threaten “the speech interests that the First Amendment
protects”71 and more deferential, relaxed review when they do not. As
Breyer explains, when “‘core’ political speech” is threatened, then “the First
Amendment imposes tight constraints” on lawmakers.72 That is because, in
his view, “the processes through which political discourse or public opinion
is formed or expressed” are “interests close to the First Amendment’s
protective core.”73 Breyer notes that other “widely accepted First
Amendment goals” meriting heightened scrutiny when they are truly
threatened include protecting unpopular ideas and viewpoints from
censorship and facilitating truth-seeking in the marketplace of ideas.74
Indeed, for Breyer, the value of protecting a robust marketplace of ideas is
linked to the promotion of democratic self-governance.75
Conversely, laws that only minimally effect such core First Amendment
interests—laws regulating ordinary business transactions, for instance—are
67.
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also
Reed, 576 U.S. at 179 (Breyer, J. concurring) (describing the “basic analysis” as “ask[ing] whether the
regulation at issue works harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the
relevant regulatory objectives”).
68.
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2306 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
69.
Reed, 576 U.S. at 179 (Breyer, J. concurring).
70.
See BREYER, supra note 66, at 164 (“Judges who use proportionality ask whether the
restriction on speech is proportionate to, or properly balances, the need.”) (emphasis added).
71.
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2304-06 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
72.
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 582 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73.
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
74.
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382–83 (2018) (Breyer,
J., dissenting). See also Reed, 576 U.S. at 176 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that strict scrutiny
applies when law regulates content in order to suppress a viewpoint).
75.
See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 583 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stressing “the constitutional
importance of maintaining a free marketplace of ideas . . . that provides access to ‘social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences,’’ and adding that “[w]ithout such a marketplace, the
public could not freely choose a government pledged to implement policies that reflect the people’s
informed will”) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
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subject to much more deferential review akin to rational basis.76 Measures
limiting the flow of truthful information about commercial goods face a
level of review somewhere in between those affecting political speech and
laws implementing economic and social policies.77
How might facets of this methodology improve the Court’s current
approach to scrutiny when laws are challenged on First Amendment freespeech grounds? The Article next proposes a two-level analysis that melds
aspects of the current categorical approach with Justice Breyer’s appeal to
First Amendment values.
III. TOWARD A TWO-STEP APPROACH TO SCRUTINY: BLENDING
CATEGORIES AND VALUES
This Article explained the friction on today’s Supreme Court over First
Amendment scrutiny standards, especially when it comes to using
heightened scrutiny to evaluate laws regulating economic and social
activities.78 It also addressed the worry that applying the sledgehammer test
that is strict scrutiny to measure the validity of laws regulating low-value
expression amounts to judicial overkill of legislative handiwork.79 The root
problem in both scenarios is that categorizing a law as content based
presumptively triggers strict scrutiny, especially after Reed held that a
benign justification cannot transform a facially content based law into a
content neutral one.80
Rather than deploying strict scrutiny solely because a law is categorized
as content based, greater energy, in Justice Breyer’s view, should be
expended on analyzing whether a law threatens core values that the First
Amendment safeguards, including protecting political speech and
unpopular viewpoints, as well as facilitating a robust marketplace of ideas
to promote truth discovery.81 Categories, in Breyer’s view, remain useful,
but only as rules of thumb that play a flexible—not definitive—role in
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.
Supra notes 1–18 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text (addressing Reed).
Supra notes 62–75 and accompanying text.
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discerning the scrupulousness of scrutiny.82
This Article advocates for a sequential, two-step or two-prong approach
to scrutiny determinations. The first step is categorical. It embraces the
current approach for selecting scrutiny, but in a nonbinding fashion.
Specifically, it requires courts to decide if a statute is content neutral,
content based or viewpoint based, with such categorization creating a
rebuttable presumption that a particular level of scrutiny applies
(intermediate for content neutral laws, strict scrutiny for content based and
viewpoint based ones).83
The second step then is values oriented. It mandates that courts evaluate
whether the initial scrutiny presumption should be rebutted. In particular,
it obliges them, in Breyer-based fashion, to analyze whether the statute at
issue threatens a core First Amendment value (or values) and, if so, the
gravity of the threat to that value. Those key values include, but are not
limited to, ones Breyer has, to one degree or another, already recognized:84
(1) protecting political speech and political discourse that might, as
philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn put it, facilitate “the voting of
wise decisions;”85 (2) safeguarding the processes of truth-seeking and truthtesting in the metaphorical public marketplace of ideas; and (3) shielding
ideas, viewpoints and information from censorship simply because they are
unpopular. Courts are free here to consider if other First Amendment values,
such as individual self-realization and self-fulfillment through the receipt of
speech and engagement in it, are jeopardized.86
Depending on whether or not a court determines that any such values
are threatened by a statute and, in turn, how serious or grave the threat is to
those values, it is then free to rebut the initial scrutiny presumption and work
its way up or down the three typical tiers of scrutiny in constitutional law—
82.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text (setting forth Breyer’s articulation of a rule of
thumb).
83.
See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (summarizing this aspect of the categorical
approach).
84.
See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text (addressing First Amendment values and
interests that Breyer has recognized).
85.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25
(1948).
86.
See, e.g., T HOMAS I. E MERSON , T HE S YSTEM OF F REE E XPRESSION 6 (1970) (asserting
that “freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment. The proper
end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities as a human being”).
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strict, intermediate and rational basis. A jump downward by more than one
tier of scrutiny—in other words, moving down from strict scrutiny to
rational basis review—would require a greater level of proof by a court that
no First Amendment interests are jeopardized in any serious fashion than
would a move downward by only one tier of scrutiny from either strict to
intermediate or from intermediate to rational basis review.
This approach, in turn, would also encourage attorneys in First
Amendment speech cases to elaborate in their briefs and during oral
argument on whether or not First Amendment values are endangered by a
statute. Attorneys, in other words, would have the opportunity to argue to
courts something along the lines of—colloquially speaking—“I know this
law is content based and thus presumptively should face strict scrutiny
under Reed, but here’s why you should not follow that presumption and,
instead, why you should apply a lower standard of review. In short, no First
Amendment values are possibly harmed in any serious fashion by the
statute.” Or, in another scenario, they might contend, “We understand this
law is content neutral and thus presumptively is subject to intermediate
scrutiny, but the law nonetheless seriously imperils multiple core First
Amendment values and thus we respectfully request that you ratchet upward
the level of review to strict scrutiny.”
This obviously is a rough, working framework for First Amendment
scrutiny going forward. The nuances must be worked out over time by
courts, but the values-based second prong is deliberately flexible in order to
afford courts latitude in their analysis rather than being boxed in, as they
now are, by a purely categorical methodology. The constricted and
restricted nature of the categorical approach, after all, is a primary complaint
of Justice Breyer, whose values-centric tack animates this second step of
this proposal. The bottom line is that a blend of nonbinding categories,
supplemented by serious consideration and analysis of First Amendment
values, may offer the Court the best of both the categorical and balancing
worlds.
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